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THE "BERMUDA" CAPACITY CLAUSES
By P.

VAN DER TUUK ADRIANI

Head of the Bureau for Air Policy of the Juridical and Political
Department of the Netherlands Civil Aviation Administration.

S

INCE 1946 the name Bermuda has taken on a very specific meaning
in all circles related to civil aviation. Not so much for the touristic
charms of these islands in this case-however wonderful they may bebut for reasons which have an immediate bearing on the very fundamentals of commercial airline operation.
As a matter of fact it was on the Bermuda islands that the United
States and the United Kingdom negotiated a civil aviation agreement
in February 1946. The fact that a treaty or an agreement bears the
name of the place where it was concluded is not unusual at all. Yet
one could wonder why a simple bilateral air agreement-even between
two very important countries-could not only become so renown,
studied and discussed, and set a pattern to be followed all over the
world, but could even become quite a definite conception.
How is this to be explained? By the mere fact that the Final Act
of the negotiations-not even the agreement itself-contained a few
paragraphs on how competition between the airlines of both parties
should be kept within reasonable limits? This is really the case, but
still one could wonder why these few clauses found such a world wide
application.
In dealing with these "Bermuda" clauses, however, one should
never forget that they were drawn up as a compromise between two
conflicting philosophies, i.e. on the one hand, a strong desire for a
large amount of freedom for commercial activity, and on the other
hand, an equally strong desire for protection of national civil aviation
interests. It seems that these compromise-clauses were in accord with
vague and lingering thoughts in many other countries all over the
world, which countries however had not been able to formulate them
clearly.
Still another question arises, namely how it was possible, that the
Bermuda clauses, drafted in a very special case, could be copied on so
many other occasions. This should be attributed to the fact that these
Bermuda clauses were drafted in general terms, just formulating some
broad ideas and are therefore to a certain extent vague and flexible,
creating possibilities for protection as well as for a necessary amount
of freedom.
Two Categories of Stipulations
In themselves the so-called Bermuda clauses could be divided into
two categories of stipulations. On the one hand there are some general
rules as to competition, the most widely known and copied of which
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state "that the air transport facilities available to the traveling public
should bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for
such transport," "that there shall be a fair and equal opportunity for
the carriers of the two nations to operate on any route between their
respective territories," and "that in the operation by the air carriers
of either government of the trunk services, the interest of the air
carriers of the other government shall be taken into consideration so
as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or
part of the same routes."
On the other hand there is a clause which deals more closely with
competition in so far as it sets rules as regards the capacity which the
designated air carriers of the contracting parties are allowed to provide,
thereby stating that this capacity should in the first place have a bearing on third and fourth freedom traffic. As a matter of fact the rule
in question runs as follows:
"That it is the understanding of both Governments that services
provided by a designated air carrier under the Agreement and its
Annex shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which
such air carrier is a national and the country of ultimate destination
of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services
international traffic destined for and coming from third countries
at a point or points on the routes specified in the Annex to the
Agreement shall be applied in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both Governments subscribe
and shall be subject to the general principle that their capacity
should be related:
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and
the countries of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the
airline passes after taking account of local and regional
services."
After having reproduced the wording of the principle Bermuda

clauses it seems interesting to try and interpret them, beginning with
the last mentioned clause. A first glance at its wording reveals, that
it is beyond doubt that the capacity cannot be tied down to what is
called the primary objective but that the capacity required for this
traffic may be augmented by a supplementary capacity for the carriage
of fifth freedom traffic.
First of all, if there is a primary objective, there should also be
room for other objectives, otherwise the provision of capacity for 3rd
and 4th freedom should have been made the only object to be dealt
with.

In the second place the clause explicitly mentions the right to
embark or disembark (at a point or points) in the territory of the
other contracting party international traffic destined for and coming
from third countries. This right is, however, not unlimited; it shall
be applied in accordance with the general principle of orderly develop-
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ment. When putting the question on which of these two words the
stress should fall, it seems that they should be stressed as even here
the conflicting philosophies have come to a compromise; the word
"orderly" clearly pointing into the direction of protection and of proceeding step by step after careful consideration of all aspects and more
or less implying something static in this way, whereas the word deilelopment on the contrary points into the direction of commercial and
dynamic enterprise.
General Principle of Capacity
Finally and as a sort of summing up, a general principle aS regards
capacity is given, containing three elements to which this capacity
should be related.
Item (a) seems a repetition, though in other Words, of the
above-mentioned "primary objective." Yet the difference in wording makes this stipulation less tight; it seems beyond doubt that
the traffic requirements mentioned here may be taken in a bi-oader
sense than the capacity adequate to the traffic demands between
the country of which such air carrier is a national arid the country
of ultimate destination and so may also comprise-as the case may
be-some transit traffic.
Item (b) even puts forward the carriage of fifth freedom traffic
as essential to the economic operation of air routes Which consist
of more than one stage; at the intermediate landing-points passengers and goods coming from the starting point of the line are
disembarked. If it should not be allowed to fill these vacant
places with passengers and goods, picked up at these intermediate
stopping places, the airline would certainly work at a loss.
Item (c) states through its very wording clearly and rightly
that countries or peoples do have traffic requirements and that
foreign airlines calling there-after taking account of local and
regional services-should meet these requirements. For these foreign airlines this local and regional traffic will in many cases be
fifth freedom carriage of an "en route" nature, which could
hardly be coped with if no additional capacity can be provided.
We may conclude from the above that the Bermuda capacity
clauses clearly leave room for fifth freedom. There is, however, no
concrete answer to the question of the quantity of fifth freedom allowed
in relation to the quantity of third and fourth freedom. The fixing
of such a relation would be contrary to the very spirit of the Bermuda
principles which allow a certain amount of latitude and flexibility,
which is a "condition sine qua non" for the young and dynamic mode
of transport, civil aviation represents. On the contrary the introduction of the idea of promotional traffic in many bilateral agreements
was derived from the original Bermuda by stating that the transport
facilities should bear a close relationship to the present and reasonably
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anticipated requirements, clearly indicates that the capacity cannot
and should not be tied down to an initially or arbitrarily fixed value.
Although not laid down, in so many words, in the "Bermuda
clauses" themselves, the application of these clauses is based on the
idea of an ex post facto review whereby the air carrier in question
should substantiate after a reasonable period that the capacity it has
provided in that period reasonably concurred with the Bermuda principles. In applying such an ex post facto review ample consideration
should be given to the fact that the presence of transport facilities
always tends to stimulate the traffic requirements of the public. This
means that a foreign line not merely brings about competition but
also contributes to building up traffic. From this increased traffic the
national carrier as well will certainly reap benefits.
Relationship of Capacity and Traffic Requirements

Another refinement in quite a number of bilateral agreements,
otherwise based on the Bermuda principles, is the introduction of the
words "at a reasonable load factor" in the clause, requiring a close
relationship between the capacity and the traffic requirements.
This insertion seems very much to the point indeed. A strict
interpretation of the requirement that there should be a close relationship between the capacity provided and the requirements for
transportation, could easily lead to a situation whereby the carrier
in question would not be allowed to augment its capacity unless its
aircraft were permanently loaded to 100% of their capacity.
However, it is a well known fact that operating a transport service
at an over-all load factor of more than 65 or 70 per cent of its capacity
is not a sound proposition; in these circumstances quite a number of
the individual services are fully booked and the operator would on
many occasions have to disappoint prospective passengers.
In the long run the passengers will be inclined to turn away from
the carrier in question.
As it is beyond any doubt that such a situation was certainly not
meant by those who drafted the original Bermuda, but that they on
the contrary simply had in mind to avoid a situation whereby one
carrier could take for its account too great a part of the traffic to the
detriment of the partner by providing excessive capacity, it seems clear
that even if the notion of a reasonable load factor is not explicitly
introduced, this idea should be kept in mind when considering the
capacity which the other contracting party thinks appropriate to introduce or maintain.
The share which the air carriers of each of the two contracting
parties may take in the traffic brings us to the clause already mentioned,
that there shall be a fair and equal opportunity .

.

. etc.

Yet it seems necessary to make a very clear distinction between
the opportunity to operate and the share in the operations. Without
any doubt it would be a serious mistake to interpret this clause in a
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sense as if the carriers of both contracting parties should necessarily
take a fair and equal share in the traffic. This could not be the question for the simple reason that when interpreting this clause in this
way the words "fair" and "equal" would be conflicting, for in this
case neither "fair" would always be identical to "equal" nor would
"equality" always be "fair."
On the contrary, except in those special cases of a complete "balance of power," much will depend on the circumstances prevailing.
If equality of the share should be sought this would mean that the
stronger or more enterprising carrier of one country would have to
settle down on the lower level of the carrier of the other country.
Such a situation would certainly not be in favor of the needs of the
public nor would it be fair towards the other carrier. So one might
even be inclined to say that the fairness invoked in reality excludes.
a complete equality.
But the clause rightly aims at a fair and equal opportunity to operate which means that the carrier of one party which happens to be
the weaker still has the same-equal-fundamental right to operate as
the stronger competitor and should just as well be enabled to have
its place under the sun. And this cannot be but fair, even if in practice
this place might only be a modest one. This conception also naturally
leads to the following clause "that in the operation by the air carriers
of either government the interest of the air carriers of the other government shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly
the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes."
This clause might possibly be considered as the crucial point and
the very fundamental idea behind the Bermuda: competition is all
right but no cut-throat competition in the sense of striving for a
monopoly or the domination by one party over the other. On the
contrary this clause seems to revive the old slogan of: "live and let live."
The Load Factor and Fifth Freedom
The acknowledgement of the fact that the over-all load factor
should not be required to exceed a reasonable and commercially sound
figure should also be taken into consideration by the governments
when reviewing the capacity offered by a foreign air carrier for fifth
freedom traffic in their countries. When for instance the third and
fourth freedom traffic of that carrier would take 40 per cent of the
total capacity provided by it, it would seem that the carrier in question offers 60% of its capacity for fifth freedom traffic which would
not seem to be in accordance with the primary place the third and
fourth freedom traffic should take. Yet considering that a transport
service filled for 65 or 70 per cent is a commercially sound proposition,
the average room available for fifth freedom traffic is no more than
25 or 30 per cent, which is only half the space seemingly offered at
first sight.
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This simple example may show that (air) transportation should
not be approached in an arithmetical spirit but with wide open eyes
both for the needs of the air carriers and those of the traveling public.
That the authors of the original Bermuda principles limited themselves to broad lines and refrained from going into too precise details
is an act of wisdom that cannot be overestimated. Too rigid an application of the close relationship-clause might also lead to the danger
that the carrier in question would have to use types of aircraft of
different capacity on different stages of a single route or aircraft especially adapted to the traffic requirements on each of the routes mentioned in the agreement.
Most airlines strive however for the sound commercial principle
of standardizing their fleets to the greatest possible extent. Moreover
for the sake of safe operation even on routes where smaller aircraft
could be used in view of the traffic requirements, multi-engined aircraft, mostly therefore of a larger carrying capacity, should sometimes
be used.
Although in some cases a change of gauge-which means that a
further stage of a route is operated with aircraft of smaller capacity
connecting with the heavier aircraft operating the initial and more
important stage of that route-is applied, this does not occur very often.
Admittedly such a change of gauge may imply that the close relation clause can be applied more accurately. Such a change of gauge
requires however that aircraft should be permanently stationed in
foreign countries which can never be very profitable unless the traffic
on that further stage is relatively heavy, because of which the frequency
will be high enough to have these smaller aircraft making their normal
share of flying hours. In other cases the aircraft in question-and their
crews-would remain idle for long periods which only costs lots of
money.
These different examples may show that the Bermuda principles
closely bound up with the capacity to be provided can only work
properly when traffic is such as to require a carrying capacity which is
a multiple of the carrying capacity of a single normal modern aircraft,
so that a certain number of frequencies is to be provided.
Only in this case the ex post facto review can be applied without
endangering a certain minimum of operation which is necessary for
an airline from an economic point of view. Only in case there is a
rather important traffic the flexibility laid down in the broad Bermuda
principles is done full justice. Care should therefore be taken that
these principles are not applied too rigidly where traffic is only moderate as yet.
In this connection it should be recognized that most of the air
routes mentioned in the original Bermuda agreement are trunkroutes
on which heavy traffic was to be expected.
Furthermore the Bermuda agreement was probably drafted with
a view to the future development of civil aviation with possibilities
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hardly foreseeable at the time of its conclusion and still hardly foreseeable even now.
Effect of Geographic Situations
Another point which may influence the interpretation of the Bermuda principles is the geographical situation of the contracting parties.
It goes without saying that the interpretation of these principles is
much easier when they would apply to the operation of air services
which have their starting point in one contracting country and their
terminus in the other, than when the air carriers of both contracting
parties or of one of them operate through services to countries beyond.
In the first case the primary objective is the carriage of traffic between
the two contracting parties and the fifth freedom traffic takes place
between the territory of the other contracting party and one or more
countries situated on the route.
If, however, the situation of one contracting state is such that it
forms an intermediate landing point for the carrier of the other country
it sometimes might be difficult to realize that the capacity provided by
the air carrier of that other contracting country should be considered
in relation to the operation of the whole of the route and not to that
of the stage between the country and the home country of the carrier
in question.
In such a situation the possibility exists without any doubt for the
carrier in question to operate fifth freedom traffic not only on one
or more stages of the route between the contracting parties but on
the stages of the route to the countries beyond as well.
This more complicated situation arises especially on long routes
with many intermediate stops. On such routes however the primary
objective is not only the carriage between the home country of the
air carrier and the other contracting state, but also the carriage between
the home country and the various other countries where the airline
calls and last but not least the carriage between the home country and
the place where the air service finds its terminus.
To operate such routes economically, the requirements of through
airline operation, i.e., the ability to pick up en route fifth freedom
traffic to fill up vacant places, is a necessity. Perhaps later on when
air traffic will have developed to full maturity the air carriers themselves may prefer to operate different services which run parallel to
the initial stages on such routes, but which subsequently terminate at
what are now only intermediate landing points. In such a system the
carriage of fifth freedom traffic might become less important.
Although one could in a few cases already see indications of the
commencement of this development, air transport is by no means on
a level as yet where such a system could be generally applied. The
carriage of fifth freedom traffic is therefore at present essential and
should for this reason not be withheld from the operators of trunk
services, though in operating such fifth freedom traffic the air carrier
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should take account of local and regional services, as the Bermuda
agreement rightly states.
Reasonableness of Bermuda Principles
Everything taken together it seems that the Bermuda principlesand such probably owing to the fact that they represent a compromise
-have a sound conception of reasonableness as their basis. It seems,
therefore, that these principles should be dealt with in a similar spirit.
Only in this way can the limitations for which the Bermuda principles
leave room be prevented from becoming impediments to the legitimate aspirations of the air carriers.
Let us not forget that another, and in fact the first item of the
Final Act of the original Bermuda Agreement, reveals the desire "to
foster and encourage the widest distribution of the benefits of air
travel for the general good of mankind and to stimulate international
air travel as a means of promoting friendly understanding and good
will among peoples and ensuring the many indirect benefits of this
new form of transportation to the common welfare of both countries."
When copying the Bermuda clauses as has been done in so many
cases this statement of policy should be assumed too, for in the first
and in the last place air transport has been created and is still further
developed for the traveling public's sake.

